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The concept of intrinsic credibility has been recently
introduced to check the credibility of ‘out of the blue’
findings without any prior support. A significant result is
deemed intrinsically credible if it is in conflict with a
sceptical prior derived from the very same data that would
make the effect just non-significant. In this paper, I propose
to use Bayesian prior-predictive tail probabilities to assess
intrinsic credibility. For the standard 5% significance level,
this leads to a new p-value threshold that is remarkably close
to the recently proposed p, 0.005 standard. I also introduce
the credibility ratio, the ratio of the upper to the lower limit
(or vice versa) of a confidence interval for a significant effect
size. I show that the credibility ratio has to be smaller than
5.8 such that a significant finding is also intrinsically
credible. Finally, a p-value for intrinsic credibility is proposed
that is a simple function of the ordinary p-value and has a
direct frequentist interpretation in terms of the probability of
replicating an effect. An application to data from the Open
Science Collaboration study on the reproducibility of
psychological science suggests that intrinsic credibility of the
original experiment is better suited to predict the success of a
replication experiment than standard significance.
1. Introduction
The so-called replication crisis of science has been discussed
extensively within the scientific community [1,2]. One aspect
of the problem is the widespread misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of basic statistical concepts, such as the
p-value [3,4]. This has led to a major rethink and new proposals
for statistical inference, such as to lower the threshold for
statistical significance from the traditional 0.05 level to 0.005 for
claims of new discoveries [5,6]. The proposal would lead to
considerably fewer, but possibly more reliable, scientific claims
and has created a lot of discussion in the scientific community.
The shortcut ‘p, 0.005’ has even been shortlisted and highly
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits
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ly/2yRSWuZ.
Two arguments for this step are provided in Benjamin et al. [6]: the first is based on the Bayes factor,
the second is based on the false discovery rate. Both arguments are actually not new. Edwards et al. [7]
have already emphasized in 1963 that the evidence of p-values around 0.05 against a point null
hypothesis, as quantified by the Bayes factor, is much smaller than one would naively expect: ‘Even
the utmost generosity to the alternative hypothesis cannot make the evidence in favour of it as strong
as classical significance levels might suggest’. Likewise, Staquet et al. [8] have already argued in 1979
that the false positive rate ‘could be considerably reduced by increasing the sample sizes and by
restricting the allowance made for the a error, which should be set to a 1% level as a minimum
requirement’. Benjamin et al. [6] therefore propose to lower the threshold for statistical significance to
0.005 and to declare results with 0.05 . p. 0.005 as ‘suggestive’, emphasizing the need for replication.
In this paper, I provide a new argument for this categorization into three levels of evidence. The
approach is based on the concept of intrinsic credibility [9], a specific reverse-Bayes method to assess
the credibility of claims of new discoveries. I propose to base the assessment of intrinsic credibility on
the Box [10] check for a prior-data conflict and show that the traditional dichotomization of p-values
into ‘significant’ and ‘non-significant’ naturally leads to a more stringent threshold for intrinsic
credibility. For the standard 5% significance level, the new p-value threshold is 0.0056, remarkably
close to the proposed p, 0.005 standard. I thus provide a new argument for the 0.005 threshold for
claims of new discoveries without any prior support from preceding studies.
To assess intrinsic credibility based on a confidence interval rather than a p-value, I propose the
credibility ratio, the ratio of the upper to the lower limit (or vice versa) of the confidence interval for a
significant effect size. I show that the credibility ratio has to be smaller than 5.8 to ensure that a
significant finding is also intrinsically credible. In §2, I provide a brief summary of the Analysis of
Credibility and the concept of intrinsic credibility. The latter is central to the derivation of a threshold
for intrinsic credibility, as outlined in §3.
Lowering the threshold of statistical significance is only a temporary response to the replication crisis
[11]. A more radical step would be to abandon significance thresholds altogether [12], leaving p-values as
a purely quantitative measure of the evidence against a point null hypothesis. In this spirit, I extend the
concept of intrinsic credibility and propose in §4 the p-value for intrinsic credibility, pIC. This new
measure provides a quantitative assessment of intrinsic credibility—without any need for
thresholding—and has a useful interpretation in terms of the probability of replicating an effect [13].
Intrinsic credibility is thus directly linked to replication, a topic of central importance in the current
debate on research reproducibility [14]. Section 5 describes an application to data from the Open
Science Collaboration study on the reproducibility of psychological science [15] which suggests that
intrinsic credibility of the original experiment is better suited to predict the success of a replication
experiment than standard significance. I close with some discussion in §6.
2. Analysis of credibility
Reverse-Bayes approaches allow the extraction of the properties of the prior distribution needed to
achieve a certain posterior statement for the data at hand. The idea to use Bayes’s theorem in reverse
originates in the work by IJ Good [16,17] and is increasingly used to assess the plausibility of
scientific claims and findings [18–21]. Matthews [22,23] has proposed the Analysis of Credibility, a
specific reverse-Bayes method to challenge claims of ‘significance’; see Matthews [9] for more recent
developments.
Analysis of Credibility is based on a conventional confidence interval of level g, say, for an unknown
effect size u with lower limit L and upper limit U, say. In the following, I assume that both L and U are
symmetric around the effect estimate u^  N(u, s2) (assumed to be normally distributed) and that both
are either positive or negative, i.e. the effect is significant at significance level a ¼ 12 g. Matthews [22,23]
proposed assessing the credibility of a statistically significant finding by computing from the data a
sufficiently sceptical prior distribution for the effect size u  N(0, t2), that—combined with the
information given in the confidence interval for u—results in a posterior distribution which is just
non-significant at level a, i.e. either the a/2 or the 12 a/2 posterior quantile is zero. The sufficiently
sceptical prior thus describes how sceptical we would have to be to not find the apparently positive
effect estimate convincing.
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The required variance t2 of the sufficiently sceptical prior is a function of the variance s2 (the squared
standard error, assumed to be known) of the estimate u^ , the corresponding test statistic t ¼ u^=s, and za/2,
the 12 a/2 quantile of the standard normal distribution:
t2 ¼ s
2
t2=z2a=2  1
, (2:1)
where t2 . z2a=2 is required for significance at level a. Equation (2.1) shows that the prior variance t
2 can
be both smaller or larger than s2, depending on the value of t2. If t2 is substantially larger than z2a=2, then
t2 will be relatively small, i.e. a relatively tight prior is needed to make the significant result non-
significant. If t2 is close to z2a=2 (i.e. the effect is ‘borderline significant’), then t
2 will be relatively large,
i.e. a relatively vague prior is sufficient to make the significant result non-significant.
It can also be shown [22] that the limits +S of the equi-tailed credible interval of the sufficiently
sceptical prior at level g are given by
S ¼ (U  L)
2
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
UL
p , (2:2)
where S is called the scepticism limit and the interval [2 S, S] the critical prior interval. Note that (2.2) holds
for any level g, not just for the traditional 95% level.
Two examples of the Analysis of Credibility are shown in figure 1. Both are based on a confidence
interval of width 3, but with different location (u^ ¼ 2:5 and 11/6 ¼ 1.83, respectively). Each figure has
to be read from right to left: To obtain a 95% posterior credible interval with lower limit 0 (shown in
green), the 95% confidence interval for the unknown effect size u (shown in red) has to be combined
with the sufficiently sceptical prior with variance (2.1) (shown in blue).
In this paper, I focus on claims of new discoveries without any prior support. To assess the credibility
of such ‘out of the blue’ findings, Matthews [9] suggested the concept of intrinsic credibility, declaring an
effect as intrinsically credible if it is in conflict with the sufficiently sceptical prior that would make the
effect non-significant. This can be thought of as an additional check to ensure that a significant effect is
not spurious. Specifically, Matthews [9] declares a result as intrinsically credible at level a, if the effect
estimate u^ is outside the critical prior interval, i.e. ju^ j . S. He shows that, for confidence intervals at
level g ¼ 0.95, this is equivalent to the ordinary two-sided p-value being smaller than 0.0127. I refine
the definition of intrinsic credibility in the following §3 based on the Box [10] prior-predictive
approach, leading to the more stringent p-value threshold 0.0056 for intrinsic credibility at the 5%
level. The result shown in figure 1a is thus intrinsically credible (p ¼ 0.0011, 0.0056) whereas the one
in figure 1b is not (p ¼ 0.017. 0.0056).
3. A new threshold for intrinsic credibility
Matthews’ check for intrinsic credibility compares the size of u^ with the scepticism limit (2.2), so does not
take the uncertainty of u^ into account. He compares the estimate u^ with the (sufficiently sceptical) prior
distribution, not with the corresponding prior-predictive distribution. However, the use of tail
probabilities based on the prior-predictive distribution is the established way to check the compatibility
of the data and the prior [10,18]. See the discussion and the rejoinder of [10, pp. 404–430] for further
aspects of the prior-predictive model criticism approach. An alternative approach to check the
compatibility between prior and data has been recently proposed by de Carvalho et al. [24].
In the following I will apply the approach by Box [10] for the assessment of prior-data conflict based
on the prior-predictive distribution, with the perhaps slightly unusual feature that the prior has been
derived from the data. The maximum-likelihood prior [25], the max-compatible prior [24] and
adaptive priors [26,27] are other examples of data-based prior distributions. I argue that there is
nothing intrinsically inconsistent in investigating the compatibility of a prior, defined through the
data, and the data itself, extending an argument by Cox [28, Section 5.10] to the reverse-Bayes setting.
The Box [10] check for prior-data conflict is based on the prior-predictive distribution, which is in
our case normal with mean zero and variance t2 þ s2 [29, Section 5.8]. The procedure is based on
the test statistic tBox ¼ u^=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
t2 þ s2p and the (two-sided) tail probability pBox ¼ Pr (x2(1)  t2Box) as the
corresponding upper tail of a x2-distribution with one degree of freedom. Small values of pBox
indicate a conflict between the sufficiently sceptical prior and the data.
Now suppose we fix the confidence level at the conventional 95% level, i.e. g ¼ 0.95. Intrinsic
credibility at the 5% level (i.e. pBox , 0.05) can then be shown to be equivalent to the requirement
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
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p , 0.0056 for the ordinary two-sided p-value. To derive this result, note that with equation (2.1), we
have t2 þ s2 ¼ s2=(1 z2a=2=t2) and so t2Box ¼ t2  z2a=2. The requirement t2Box . z2a=2 for intrinsic
credibility at level a then translates to
t2  2z2a=2: (3:1)
This criterion is to be compared with the traditional check for significance, which requires only t2  z2a=2.
It follows directly that the threshold
aIC ¼ 2 1F t ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
za=2
 n o
, (3:2)
here F() denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function, can be used to assess intrinsic
credibility based on the ordinary two-sided p-value p: If p is smaller than aIC, then the result is
intrinsically credible at level a. For a ¼ 0.05, we have t ¼ ﬃﬃﬃ2p  1:96 ¼ 2:77 and the threshold (3.2)
turns out to be aIC ¼ 0.0056, as claimed above. For other significance levels, we will obtain other
intrinsic credibility thresholds. For example, Clayton & Hills [30, Section 10.1] prefer to use 90%
confidence intervals ‘on the grounds that they give a better impression of the range of plausible
values’. Then a ¼ 0.1 and we obtain the intrinsic credibility threshold aIC ¼ 0.02.
Figure 2 compares the new threshold with the one obtained by Matthews [9, appendix A.4] (using t ¼
1.272 za/2) for values of a below 10%. The Matthews threshold for intrinsic credibility is larger than the
proposed new threshold (3.2), because it compares the effect estimate u^ with the prior distribution (with
variance t2), not with the prior-predictive distribution (with variance t2 þ s2).
Intrinsic credibility can also be assessed based on the confidence interval [L, U ], rather than the
p-value p. If both L and U are either positive or negative, then t2Box can be written in terms of L and U,
t2Box ¼ z2a=2
4UL
(U  L)2 , (3:3)
see appendix for a derivation. The requirement t2Box  z2a=2 for intrinsic credibility is then equivalent to
require that the credibility ratio U/L (or L/U if both L and U are negative) fulfils
U
L
 d ¼ 3þ 2
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
 5:8: (3:4)
ef
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−2
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3
4
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data posterior
S
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Figure 1. Analysis of intrinsic credibility for two confidence intervals [L, U ] at level g ¼ 95%. In the first example, there is a
conflict between the sufficiently sceptical prior and the data and the significant result is intrinsically credible at the 5% level
(L ¼ 1, U ¼ 4, credibility ratio ¼ 4, pIC ¼ 0.021). In the second example, there is less conflict between prior and data and
the significant result is not intrinsically credible at the 5% level (L ¼ 1/3, U ¼ 10/3, credibility ratio = 10, pIC ¼ 0.09). The
credibility ratio will be described further in §3 while the p-value pIC for intrinsic credibility will be introduced in §4.
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To derive the cut-point d in equation (3.4), set U ¼ L d. The requirement t2Box ¼ z2a=2 then reduces to
1 ¼ 4UL
(U  L)2 ¼
4d
(d 1)2 ,
a quadratic equation in d with d ¼ 3þ 2 ﬃﬃﬃ2p as solution.
Thus, there is a second way to assess intrinsic credibility based on the ratio of the limits of a ‘significant’
confidence interval at any level g: if the credibility ratio is smaller than 5.8 than the result is credible at level
a ¼ 12 g. For example, the credibility ratio is 4 in figure 1a and 10 in figure 1b, so the result shown in
figure 1a is intrinsically credible at the 5% level, but the one in figure 1b is not.
If the sufficiently sceptical prior is available, then a third way to assess intrinsic credibility is to
compare the prior variance t2 to the data variance s2. Comparing equation (2.1) with equation (3.1), it
is easy to see that intrinsic credibility is achieved if and only if the sufficiently sceptical prior variance
t2 is not larger than the variance s2 of the effect estimate u^ . With this in mind, we see immediately
that the first result shown in figure 1a is intrinsically credible (t2, s2), whereas the one shown in
figure 1b is not (t2 . s2).
4. A p-value for intrinsic credibility
A disadvantage of the dichotomous assessment of intrinsic credibility described in the previous section is
the dependence on the confidence level g ¼ 12 a of the underlying confidence interval. However, there
is a way to free ourselves from this dependence. In analogy to the well-known duality of confidence
intervals and standard p-values, I propose to derive the confidence level gw ¼ 1 pIC, say, that just
achieves intrinsic credibility, i.e. where equality holds in (3.1). This defines the p-value for intrinsic
credibility pIC ¼ 1 gw, which provides a quantitative assessment of intrinsic credibility. The p-value
for intrinsic credibility pIC can also be used to assess intrinsic credibility as described in §3: if pIC  a,
then the result is intrinsically credible at level a.
The p-value pIC for intrinsic credibility can be derived by replacing aIC with p and a with pIC in
equation (3.2) and then solving for pIC:
pIC ¼ 2 1F tﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
  
: (4:1)
Here t ¼ F21(12 p/2) is the standard test statistic for significance where p is the ordinary two-sided
p-value. Figure 3 shows that the p-value pIC for intrinsic credibility is considerably larger than the
ordinary p-value p, particularly for small values of p. For example, the two confidence intervals
shown in figure 1 have ordinary p-values p ¼ 0.0011 (figure 1a) and p ¼ 0.017 (figure 1b), while the
corresponding p-values for intrinsic credibility are pIC ¼ 0.021 and pIC ¼ 0.09, respectively.
It is also possible to define a one-sided version of the p-value for intrinsic credibility, which turns out
to be just half as large as the two-sided one, see Held [31] for a derivation in the more general context of
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
a
a I
C
0.08 0.10
0
0.01
0.03
0.0056
0.0127
0.05
0.001
0.003
0.02
0.036 Matthews threshold
new threshold
Figure 2. The threshold for intrinsic credibility of significant results as a function of the conventional a level. The blue line
corresponds to the proposal by Matthews [9]. The red line is the proposed new threshold.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.open
sci.6:181534
5
replication studies. The same relationship also exists of course between one- and two-sided ordinary
p-values, which implies that figure 3 is also valid for the corresponding one-sided p-values. In the
following, we will only use the two-sided p-value for intrinsic credibility, as defined in (4.1).
There is a direct and useful interpretation of pIC in terms of the probability of replicating an effect, prep
[13], i.e. the probability that an identically designed but independent replication study will give an
estimated effect u^2 in the same direction as the estimate u^1 ¼ u^ from the current (first) study. To see
this, note that under an initial uniform prior the posterior for u is u j u^1  N(u^1, s2). This posterior
now serves as the prior for the mean of the (unobserved) estimate u^2 j u  N(u, s2) from the second
(hypothetical) study, where we assumed the two studies to be identically designed, having equal
variances s2. This leads to the prior-predictive distribution u^2 j u^1  N(u^1, 2s2) and the p-value for
intrinsic credibility (4.1) can be seen to be twice the probability that the second study will give an
estimate u^2 in the opposite direction to the estimate u^1 of the first study:
pIC ¼ 2 1F tﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
  
¼ 2F tﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
 
¼ 2F 0 u^1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
s
 !
¼ 2 Pr (u^2  0 j u^1 . 0):
If u^1 , 0, then pIC ¼ 2 Pr (u^2  0 j u^1 , 0).
The probability Pr (u^2  0 j u^1 . 0) is one of the three replication probabilities that have been
considered by Senn [32] in response to Goodman [33]. The complementary probability
Pr (u^2 . 0 j u^1 . 0) ¼ 1 pIC=2 can be identified as the probability of replicating an effect, prep,
advocated by Killeen [13] as an alternative to traditional p-values, see Lecoutre & Poitevineau [34] for
further discussion and additional references. Of course, prep is calculated under the assumption that
the probability of the null hypothesis (H0:u ¼ 0) is zero. Nevertheless, Killeen [35] argues that the use
of a predictive procedure such as prep provides a more positive and productive approach to scientific
inference and interpretation than traditional p-values.
In practice, we can thus use pIC to assess the probability of replicating an effect, assuming that the null
hypothesis is false: prep ¼ 1 pIC=2. An intrinsically credible result with pIC  a therefore has
prep  1 a=2. For example, for a ¼ 5% we have prep  97:5%. For numerical illustration, recall that
the p-values for intrinsic credibility in figure 1 are pIC ¼ 0.021 (figure 1a) and pIC ¼ 0.09 (figure 1b).
The corresponding replication probabilities are thus prep ¼ 99:0% and prep ¼ 95:5%. In the second
example, there is thus a prep ¼ 4:5% chance that an identically designed replication study will give a
negative effect estimate.
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Figure 3. The p-value for intrinsic credibility as a function of the p-value for significance. The grey dashed line is the identity line.
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5. Application
I now reanalyse data from the Open Science Collaboration study on the reproducibility of psychological
science [15], where 99 studies report p-values for both the original and the replication experiment. First, I
have grouped the original studies into significant and non-significant at varying levels of a. For each
group, I have calculated the proportion of significant replication experiments at the same level a. The
two proportions are compared in figure 4a as a function of a. Figure 4c shows the difference in the
two proportions with 95% confidence intervals. For comparison, figure 4b shows the proportions of
significant replication experiments (at level a) for the groups of intrinsically credible and not
intrinsically credible original studies, again for varying levels of a. Figure 4d displays the difference
between these two proportions.
The overall proportion of significant replication experiments increases from 17% to 36% for the range
of a values considered (0.0001 to 0.06), see the grey lines in figure 4a. The top left plot shows that the
significance of the original experiment is a rather poor classifier to predict the success (significance) of
the replication experiment for nearly all levels of a. Specifically, among the significant original studies,
the proportion of significant replications is between 32% and 47%. Based on the confidence intervals
for the difference in proportions to the non-significant group shown in the bottom left plot, there is
evidence for a true difference only for very small a levels (a, 0.01). However, if we use intrinsic
credibility as a classifier, the proportion of significant replications is between 43% and 75% and the
difference to the other (not intrinsically credible) group is substantially larger for most values of a.
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Figure 4. Analysis of OSC data. (a,b) shows the proportion of significant replication experiments at level a, stratified by significant
and non-significant original experiments at level a (a) and intrinsically credible and not intrinsically credible original experiments at
level a (b), respectively. The level a varies between 0.0001 and 0.06. The dots at the bottom of plot (a) are the corresponding
standard p-values po and pr from the original (light grey) and replication (dark grey) experiment. The dots at the bottom of plot (b)
are the p-values for intrinsic credibility from the original experiment (light grey) and again the standard p-value pr from the
replication experiment (dark grey). (c,d) shows the differences between the corresponding proportions with 95% confidence
intervals.
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Furthermore, the lower bound of the confidence interval for the difference is nearly always positive.
These results suggest that intrinsic credibility of the original experiment is better suited to predict the
success of a replication experiment than standard significance.
6. Discussion
The concept of intrinsic credibility has been proposed to assess claims of new discoveries in the absence
of prior evidence. I have shown that a combination of the Analysis of Credibility with the Box [10] check
for prior-data conflict directly leads to a more stringent threshold aIC for intrinsic credibility.
If one prefers to avoid any thresholding of p-values, a new p-value for intrinsic credibility, pIC, has
been proposed. pIC is a quantitative measure of intrinsic credibility with a direct connection to prep,
the probability of replicating an effect [13].
The assessment of intrinsic credibility can be thought of as an additional challenge, ensuring that
claims of new discoveries are not spurious. Conventionally significant results with 0.05 . p. 0.0056
lack intrinsic credibility, i.e. they are not in conflict with the sufficiently sceptical prior that would
make the effect just non-significant. This matches the classification as ‘suggestive’ by Benjamin et al.
[6]. Specifically, p. 0.0056 implies pIC . 0.05 and thus prep , 97:5%, emphasizing the need for
replication. If p, 0.0056, then the result is both significant and intrinsically credible at the 5% level,
so pIC  0.05 and prep  97:5%.
The credibility ratio provides a simple and convenient tool to check whether a ‘significant’
confidence interval at any level g is also intrinsically credible. If the credibility ratio is smaller than
5.8, the result can be considered as intrinsically credible at level a. It is noteworthy that the concept
of intrinsic credibility does not require changing the original confidence level g. Indeed, the check for
credibility is done at the same level as the original confidence level. I have used g ¼ 0.95 by
convention, where it follows that the check for intrinsic credibility is equivalent to the requirement
p, 0.0056. This implies that in standard statistical reporting there is no need to replace 95%
confidence intervals with 99.5% confidence intervals, say. However, for claims of new discoveries,
I suggest complementing or replacing the ordinary p-value with the proposed p-value for intrinsic
credibility, pIC.
Although derived using a Bayesian approach, the proposed check for intrinsic credibility is based on
a standard confidence interval and thus constitutes a Bayes/non-Bayes compromise [36]. Specifically, it
does not require the specification of a prior probability of the null hypothesis of no effect. In fact, this
prior probability is always zero. This is in contrast to the calibration of p-values to lower bounds on
the posterior probability of the null, which requires specification of a prior probability. Minimum
Bayes factors have also been proposed to calibrate p-values, see Held & Ott [37] for a recent review.
They have the advantage that they do not require specification of a prior probability of the null
hypothesis and provide a direct ‘forward-Bayes’ assessment of the evidence of p-values. However, the
underlying rationale is still based on a point null hypothesis with positive prior probability,
fundamentally different from the approach proposed here.
The Analysis of Credibility assumes a simple mathematical framework, where likelihood, prior and
posterior are all normally distributed. This can be justified because Gaussian approximations are
commonly used in the calculation of confidence intervals and statistical hypothesis tests, if the sample
size is fairly large (e.g. [29, Section 2.4]). Of course, suitable transformations of the parameter of
interest may be needed to achieve normality, for example, confidence intervals for odds ratios and
hazard ratios should be transformed to the log scale and Fisher’s z-transformation should be applied
to correlation coefficients. For small studies, however, the normal assumption for the likelihood may
be questionable and the assessment of intrinsic credibility would need appropriate refinement, for
example, based on the t-distribution. It may also be of interest to extend the approach to settings
where the sceptical prior is conjugate to a likelihood within the exponential family.
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Appendix
Proof of equation (2.1) and (3.3)
With U, L ¼ u^ + za=2swe have UL ¼ u^ 2  z2a=2s2 and U  L ¼ 2za=2s. We therefore obtain with equation
(2.2) and t ¼ S/za/2:
t2 ¼ S
2
z2a=2
¼ (U  L)
4
16z2a=2UL
¼ (2za=2s)
4
16z2a=2UL
¼
z2a=2s
4
u^ 2  z2a=2s2
¼
z2a=2s
2
t2  z2a=2
¼ s
2
t2=z2a=2  1
:
To show equation (3.3), we use u^ 2 = ULþ z2a=2s2 and s2 = (U  L)2=(4z2a=2) and obtain
t2Box ¼ t2  z2a=2 ¼
u^ 2
s2
 z2a=2 ¼
ULþ z2a=2s2
s2
 z2a=2 ¼
UL
s2
¼ z2a=2
4UL
(U  L)2 :
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